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THE BETAMAX CASE: ANOTHER COMPULSORY
LICENSE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Marshall A. Leaffer*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE law of copyright has always been closely identified with
new technology.1 In fact, copyright law traces its origins to
fifteenth century new technology, the printing press, which for the
first time enabled reproduction of a work in large quantities for cir-
culation.2 With this invention, an author's ability to control the use
of his work once it was published was thrown into jeopardy. From
the Statute of Anne in 17108 through the Copyright Act of 1909,"
copyright legislation has been concerned with the protection of print
media.5 It was not until the twentieth century and the development
of the phonograph, radio, television, and other audiovisual recording
techniques that the book publishing model of copyright law proved
to be inadequate. To adapt to these new recording and performing
technologies, a comprehensive copyright revision project was neces-
sary.' In 1976, after twenty tedious revisions, what is now known as
the Copyright Act of 1976' was enacted. Despite the great effort ex-
pended on the revision project, and the attempt to create an all en-
compassing document, the challenge of new technologies continues
to plague copyright owners."
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., Univer-
sity of Texas; M.A., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Texas; LL.M., New York
University.
1. Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected Works, A.B.A. J. 42
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Ladd, Home Recording].
2. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE
1976 ACT 2 (5th ed. 1979).
3. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne ch. 19.
4. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter cited as 1909 Act].
5. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
652 (2d ed. 1981).
6. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
House Report].
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act].
8. See D. Ladd, Private Use, Private Property and Public Policy: Home Record-
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Twentieth Century technologies have presented particularly dif-
ficult problems of legal adaptation.9 The new media, through radio
and television, provide widespread public access to copyrighted work
while creating vast and valuable markets for copyright owners."0 At
the same time, technological innovations such as photocopying ma-
chines and audio and video recorders enable private parties to copy
entire copyrighted works quickly and inexpensively. These acts of
copying and infringement of copyright, occur privately, diffusely
with low public visibility, thereby rendering a copyright owner's ef-
forts to police these practices impractical or impossible. The 1976
Copyright Act attempted to adjust to new technological realities,
but despite the drafters' intention to produce a statute definite in its
terms yet flexible enough to protect works of authorship against the
instruments of technological change, the attempt was only partially
successful.
Because technological progress does not stand still, a seemingly
farsighted statute will soon become obsolete. Consequently, the judi-
cial process, which must work in piecemeal fashion, can no longer
harmonize the rights of copyright owners with the broad public in-
terest in having access to the fruits of creation. This article discusses
the latest attempt to adapt the copyright law to new technol-
ogy-the videotape recorder (VTR) which permits a television
viewer to copy programming directly from his television set.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America (Betamax)" held that private home
taping of a television program by a videotape recorder VTR consti-
tuted an infringement of copyright and that The Sony Corporation,
manufacturer of these machines, was liable as contributory infringer.
This case, which has been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court 12
and is the object of several proposed pieces of legislation,"3 poses
certain basic questions about the nature and purpose of copyright
ing and Reproduction of Protected Works, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
No. 548, at E-1 (Oct. 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Private Use].
9. See, e.g., Samuels, Copyright and the New Communications Technologies, 25
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 905 (1980).
10. Ladd, Home Recording, supra note 1.
11. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14,
1982) (No. 81-1687).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Betamax Case, reprinted in PAT. TRADE-
MARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 572, at D-1 (March 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Petition].
13. See infra text accompanying notes 51-118.
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law14 and proves, once again, that technological change can outstrip
the law's ability to adapt through the judicial process. Harmoniza-
tion of technological change and the rights of copyright owners will
necessitate a legislative response which, unlike judicial decision, can
adjust to the competing interests in a comprehensive, effective man-
ner. A legislative response is needed to resolve the VTR dilemma
because of the peculiar nature of the copyright interest and the
problems the copyright owner has in its protection.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW, THE AUDIO-VISUAL WORK, AND THE NEW
VIDEO INDUSTRY
A. The Nature and Purpose of Copyright
The law confers property rights on most products, physical prod-
ucts such as land or chattels, and intangible products, those pro-
tected under copyright and patent law. These intangible products
are types of information: copyright law confers property rights on
expressive information while patent law provides protection for
14. Betamax has drawn much comment. Major law review articles on the
Betamax case include: Barkan, Is Home Use In Fact Fair Use?, 3 COMM/ENT 53
(1980); Bell, Betamax Records Trial Victory. Should the Court of Appeals Replay
the Verdict?, 8 RUT. J. OF COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 85 (1980); Debrofsky, Betamax on
Trial, 18 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 95 (1979); MARSH, Betamax and
Fair Use: A Shot Gun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49 (1981); Home Video
Recording and the Copyright Act, 6 Art & L. 19 (1980); Note, Videotape Recorders:
Copyright Infringement?, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 695 (1981); Note, Copyright Infringe-
ment in Video Recording, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 621 (1981); Comment, Betamax and
Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1181; Comment, The Copy-
right Act of 1976: Home Use of Audiovisual Recording and Presentation Systems, 58
NEB. L. REV. 467 (1979); Comment, Application of the Fair Use Doctrine Under the
United States Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 661 (1980);
Note, Copyright: Gone With The Betamax?, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 45
(1978-79); Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
573 (1979); Comment, The Betamax Case: Accommodating Public Access & Eco-
nomic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243 (1979); Note, Recording of
Televised Copyrighted Works in the Home, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1295 (1981); Comment,
Copyright Act of 1976: Video Recordation and Its Fair Use, 42 U. Prr. L. REV. 317
(1981); Comment, Copyright Implications Attendant Upon the Use of Home Video-
tape Recorders, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 279 (1979); Note, Copyright: The Betamax Case,
10 U. TOL. L. REV. 203 (1978); Note, "Fair Use" Looks Different on Videotape, 66
VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980); Note, Home Videorecording & Copyright Law: The
Betamax Case, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1277 (1980); Note, Betamax and Copyright:
The Home Videorecording Controversy, 1 WHITTIER L. REV. 229 (1979); Note, Home
Video Recording, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 231 (1979). The majority of these articles advo-
cate, for various reasons, the district court's resoultuion of the case.
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technological information. The Constitution of the United States
recognizes these informational products as property by granting
Congress the authority "to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."15
The present Copyright Act, like its predecessors, implements the
constitutional provision by granting an owner of an original work of
authorship certain exclusive rights to the copyrighted work for the
statutory duration. 6 An act of infringement takes place when an in-
dividual has made an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work within
the scope of the exclusive rights and is neither a fair use nor the
subject of a specific exemption.1 7
The grant of monopoly powers to the owner of copyright, during
the term of copyright, serves two unrelated and sometimes conflict-
ing functions: protection of the author's property right to his work
under a natural law theory, and promotion of public welfare by cre-
ating economic incentives through the monopoly grant of copyright
to draw investment for the production of works of authorship." This
dual function of copyright creates a constant tension in the law.
Whereas the natural right theory of ownership would imply an au-
thor's absolute control over his work, the economic rationale of
copyright focuses the efficient allocation of resources by providing
an adequate financial return to the copyright owner as an induce-
ment to produce works of authorship.
The copyright law reflects these general principles by creating
exclusive rights while establishing exceptions to these monopoly
powers when the public interest and welfare overrides the author's
interest in the exclusive control over his work.
This tension in the copyright law arises because of the unusual
nature of a copyrighted work as a property interest. Copyrighted
works are a species of intangible property designated by economists
as public or collective goods. 9 Public goods differ from most real or
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
17. Fair Use is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979). The exemptions are
contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-18 (Supp. III 1979).
18. See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, & Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 284-313 (1970);
Perlman & Rhinelander, Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying,
Copyright and the Judicial Process, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 355, 370-79.
19. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. OF ECON. &
STAT. 387-89 (1954); accord A. ALEHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION:
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personal property in that the number of users can be increased at no
additional cost. For public goods there is no allocation or rationing
problem for the existing supply once the public good is produced.2
An infinite number of viewers can view a television program without
depriving its amount availability to anyone else. When a user of a
Betamax machine copies a television program, the program pro-
ducer's costs are not increased nor is another viewers' satisfaction
reduced by the Betamax user. Alternatively, for private goods, most
real or personal property, one person's use of the good leaves less for
someone else.
So we are faced with the dilemma that use of copyrighted work
as information should be unrestricted along with the fear that if the
author cannot sufficiently control the use of his work to recoup his
investment costs, the work will not be produced in the first place.
Through the Copyright law we wish to create incentives for the pro-
duction of works of authorship on the one hand and facilitate their
optimal use on the other.2 1
Both the Congress in passing the Copyright Act and the courts in
developing legal doctrine have tried to harmonize the natural right
of the author to his property with the economic peculiarities of in-
tangible property. In close cases courts will often side with the user
of a copyrighted work against its creator fearing that the market
place for ideas will be undermined and perhaps believing that the
copyright owner has already been sufficiently remunerated. In such
situations courts will fall back on a doctrine such as fair use2" to
uphold the public's access and use of the copyrighted work. Alterna-
tively, because the creator of information has special problems in
excluding non-payers from the use of his product, the courts have
adopted special rules of contributory and vicarious liability not
found in the protection of real or personal property. As will be seen,
COMPETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 122 (2d ed. 1977). Public or collective
goods are those for which consumption by one person in a given group of people does
not diminish the amount available for any other person in that group (once the goods
are produced); see also, Besen, Manning and Mitchel, Copyright Liability for Cable
Television: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 67
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Besen].
20. ALEHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 19.
21. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5 at 29. See also Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT.
REV. 309, 314.
22. 17 U.S.C. 107 (Supp. III 1979).
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the Ninth Circuit 3 drew the balance in favor of the creator's prop-
erty interest in holding both the home video taper as a direct in-
fringer and Sony as a contributory infringer of copyright. " Now, the
Supreme Court, by granting certiorari will have a chance to struggle
with some of the most difficult issues in copyright law. These partic-
ulars will be discussed in part III after a discussion of the basics of
copyright law as it applies to television programs, and the dynamics
of the new video industry.
B. Copyright Protection for Television Programs
Under the Copyright Act of 1976 an original work of authorship
receives a copyright protection the moment it is created.2 A work is
created when fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and embod-
ied in a material object for more than transitory duration.26 The ma-
terial object may be in the form of words printed on a page, sounds
recorded on a phonorecord, or images placed on film.'7 The form of
the material object or media is immaterial so long as the work of
authorship can be viewed by the human directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.' 8 In addition, a work is fixed when it is recorded
simultaneously with its transmission even though it had not been
previously fixed in film media or print media, such as a screenplay. 9
A television program falls into the category of statutory subject
matter designed as motion pictures or other audiovisual works.'0 Al-
though the showing of images on the television would clearly not
constitute a fixation for more than a transitory duration, most pro-
grams are either prerecorded or are fixed on tape media simultane-
ous with their broadcast.'1 Thus, television programs invariably
meet the requirement of statutory subject matter and fixation for
the purposes of federal copyright protection.
Once a work of authorship is created, the copyright owner is
23. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No. 81-1687).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 107-18.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. III 1979).
26. Id. § 101.
27. Id. § 102.
28. Id. § 101.
29. Id.; See House Report, supra note 6, at 52. Live works not fixed simultane-
ously with transmission would have to look to state theories for protection.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979).
31. House Report, supra note 6, at 52.
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granted the exclusive right to control subsequent use of his work.2
Unauthorized use, within the scope of an exclusive right, unless it
has been given express statutory exemption or is considered fair
use,"3 is copyright infringement. Five exclusive rights are enumer-
ated in section 106 of the 1976 statute.4 These exclusive rights are
the property right incentives which we hope will encourage the opti-
mal production of works of authorship.
Copyright is infringed by unauthorized acts of reproduction, ad-
aptation, distribution, performance and display3 6 But infringement
is not only committed by those directly violating the exclusive
rights; one can infringe copyright by improperly facilitating the use
of copyrighted works by knowingly causing, inducing, or providing
another with the means to accomplish an infringement."" This type
of infringement, known as contributory infringement, was found in
the Betamax case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America3 7 where liability was extended to Sony, the manufacture of
the device used to infringe the copyrighted work.
Although the exclusive rights appear absolute in their terms,
they are tempered by a series of limitations set forth in section 107
through 118 of the Act."8 These defenses or limitations are designed
to facilitate the optimal use of copyrighted works without undermin-
ing the incentives to produce the works.
The most fundamental of these limitations is the privilege of fair
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (Supp. III 1979).
33. Id. § 107.
34. (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownersip, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
36. Id. §§ 106, 501. See infra text accompanying notes 107-18.
37. 59 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14,
1982) (No. 81-1687).
38. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (Supp. III 1979).
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use, a judicially created defense to copyright now codified in section
107.39 The fair use provision lists various purposes of uses, contexts
which give rise to the defense: criticism, comment, news reporting,
research. This section had codified past judicial practice by provid-
ing an illustrative list of factors to be considered to determine fair
use.4 Traditionally, these criteria are applied on a case-by-case ba-
sis to determine whether the copyrighted materials were used in a
reasonable manner without the owner's consent, notwithstanding
the copyright monopoly."'
In sum, the determination of infringement involves two issues:
has the user reproduced, adopted, distributed, performed or dis-
played the copyrighted work and second, even so, is the particular
use sanctioned by an exemption or fair use. Because the owner of a
videotape recorder has reproduced the copyrighted television pro-
gram, the determination becomes whether he should have the right
to do so despite the copyright monopoly either under an exemption,
expressed or implied, or under the broader doctrine of fair use.
The extent of these defenses to copyright is a matter of continu-
ing debate and often depends, in close cases, on a court's fundamen-
tal attitude toward the copyright monopoly and economic function
of copyright law. To fully understand the Ninth Circuit's applica-
tion of this legal doctrine, one must be aware of the basic technology
of the industry.
C. The Industry
Within a few years time video equipment has become a major
source of income for manufacturers and distributors of consumer
39. Id. § 107. The doctrine of fair use traces its origin to the related British
doctrine of "fair dealing". See Comment, Copyright Fair Use-Case Law and Legis-
lation, 1969 DuKE L.J. 73, 74-75. The first recognition of fair using U.S. case is attrib-
uted to Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)(No. 4,901).
40. This illustrative but not exhaustive list of factors includes:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979).
41. For an elaboration of the application of fair use criteria see infra notes 76-
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electronics.2 The Betamax case has presented a basic challenge to
the new technology and whatever form the legal resolution of pri-
vate home videotaping takes will necessarily affect this rapidly grow-
ing industry.
The videotape recorder (VTR), as well as video disc, video
games, and the personal computer, depends on television for its op-
eration. These devices have changed television into more than a pas-
sive device for entertainment in that the viewer can now interact
with rather than simply react to his television. The VTR is one such
interactive device. It is the first device allowing the viewer to rear-
range the television schedule, containing a sophisticated timing
mechanism which permits the viewer to tape a program even when
absent.43 In addition, the VTR automatically records the program,
requires no developing time, and can be erased and reused. Sony
sold the first such VTR in 1965, but it was not until 1975 that the
company introduced the VTR in basically its present form for home
use and sold under the trademark Betamax. Success of the product
is represented in its sales: 800,000 machines were sold in 1980, one
million in 1981, and projections indicate sales as high as two million
units in 1982. 41 Sales of the Betamax for 1981 will constitute about
one quarter of Sony's world-wide sales which is quite remarkable
when one considers Sony's other successful products." The Sony
system is not the only available VTR. Matsushita has also developed
a video cassette format, the VHS system, incompatible with Sony's
Beta System, and has licensed its VTR system to such major compa-
nies as General Electric, Panasonic and other major companies. 4,
The VTR competes in many ways with the video disc player. Un-
like the VTR, the videodisc is a playback system which cannot re-
cord a performance on television. Lacking the time shifting capacity
and versatility of the cassette player, the videodisc would generally
appeal to someone who is looking for entertainment rather than a
42. Rudell, Home-Video Issues-Cassettes and Discs, N.Y.L. J. Dec. 24, 1981, at
1, col. 1; the entire retail sales of the leading manufacturers of VTR is estimated in
sales to be an eight billion-a-year business. Lohr, A Soft Video Recorder Market,
N.Y. Times, April 10, 1982, at 19, col. 3.
43. Video Recorders: Hearing on S. 1758 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Joseph A. Lagore, President, Sony
Consumer Products Company) [hereinafter cited as Lagore Statement].
44. Rudell, supra note 42.
45. Lagore Statement, supra note 43.
46. Rudell, supra note 42.
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more active interaction with his television. 7
There are two non-compatible disc formats available at this time,
with a third scheduled for its debut in the summer of 1982.48 Vide-
odisc players such as RCA Selectavision have retailed for as little as
$300 while the Sony Betamax retails for at least $200 more.49 Al-
though there may be room in the market for both tape and discs,
particularly with the disc player selling for a substantially lower
price, tape with its greater flexibility and multifaceted uses clearly is
the wave of the future. This trend is perhaps inevitable despite
drastic price cutting and extensive advertising campaigns by the
videodisc makers for their products.5 The extent of VTR success in
its competition with the videodisc may now depend more how the
issue of copyright infringement and liability is resolved than on the
merits of the related technologies.
III. THE BETAMAX CASE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,51 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the district court, held
that home video recording of a television program is an infringement
of copyright and that Sony Corporation of America, the manufac-
turer of the video cassette recorder (VTR), was liable as contribu-
tory infringer.2 The case was remanded to the district court for ap-
propriate relief, but the ultimate resolution may well take place in
47. Kulp, Video Revolution, Barrons, July 27, 1981, at 24 [hereinafter cited as
Barrons]; there is some indication that the VTR industry's period of phenomenal
growth has begun to slow down to projected growth of 15 to 25% increases per year
as compared with 100% annual growth by the industry. The decline is due to the
worldwide recession and the fact that the demand has been satisfied for the most
eager buyers. Prices for VTR range from $400 to $1,500 depending on the various
features included in the machine. Pervasive price cutting is noted in a market caught
with overcapacity and mounting inventories. See Lohr, supra note 42.
48. Rudell, supra note 42: today the VHS format accounts for 65% of the mar-
ket whereas the Sony's Beta System enjoys a 35% market share. See Lohr, supra
note 42.
49. Landro, RCA Blaming Excessive Optimism for Slow Sales of Videodisc
Player, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1982, at 23, col. 4.
50. RCA Cuts Videodisk Unit's Price, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1982 at 31, col.6;
RCA, Responding to Retailers' Discounts, Cuts 1982 Videodisk Player Price by $150,
Wall St. J., February 11, 1982, at 14, col. 1.
51. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14,
1982) (No. 81-1687).
52. Id. at 975-76.
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the Supreme Court,53 unless Congress, 54 in the meantime, amends
the Copyright Act either to exempt private home taping or establish
a royalty mechanism to compensate the copyright owner by taxing
the sale of recorder units, blank cassettes, or both, and distributing
the proceeds to copyright owners.5
The plaintiffs are Universal Studios and Walt Disney Produc-
tions, who produce various kinds of audiovisual materials often
broadcast over public airwaves. Sony Corporation, the manufacturer
of Betamax, along with an individual owner of Betamax who used it
to tape a television program, are the defendants. In finding infringe-
ment, the Ninth Circuit decided three major issues: whether off-the-
air taping of copyrighted audiovisual material by owners of a video-
tape recorder in their home for private non-commercial use consti-
tutes an infringement; whether the corporate defendants are liable
for direct, contributory, or vicarious infringement; and, if liability is
found, the nature of the relief granted. 6
If the Supreme Court follows the reasoning of the court of ap-
peals the Betamax case will be important in the development of cop-
yright law for several reasons which transcend the immediate resolu-
tion of the VTR issue. The first is the judicial attempt to adapt
copyright law to meet the challenge of the new technology through a
narrowing of the doctrine of fair use.5 7 Second, the case is also im-
portant in broadening the concept of contributory infringement, the
liability of persons who knowingly induce, cause, or provide the
means for another to infringe copyright law.5 8 Finally, the Betamax
case may well establish precedent in providing a novel form of rem-
edy, a judicially fashioned compulsory license, to compensate copy-
right owners to future infringement by unknown defendants.5 9
A. Direct Infringement: Exemption or Fair Use
The first issue the court approached was the liability of the pri-
53. The defendants have petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. See Peti-
tion, supra note 12.
54. Several legislative proposals have been introduced exempting home video re-
cording and others setting up a compulsory licensing scheme. See notes 147-73 infra.
55. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 964.
57. See id. at 969-74.
58. Id. at 974-76.
59. Id. at 976.
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vate individual for his home taping." For practical reasons, the
plaintiffs were not interested in suing a widely dispersed number of
individual home tapers but resolution of this issue was vital to
plaintiff's case because of the relationship between direct and con-
tributory infringement." To hold Sony liable as contributory in-
fringer, there must first be a finding that the user of the machine
was a direct or primary infringer of copyright. The district court had
found that the individual defendant was not a direct infringer"2 and
thus, derivatively exonerated Sony from a charge of contributory in-
fringement for two reasons: there was an implied exemption for off-
the-air taping for private use in the Copyright Act6 3 and, second,
even without this exemption, the private tape was privileged under
the doctrine of fair use. 4
B. An Implied Exemption for Videotaping
The Court of Appeals refused to find an implied exemption in
the 1976 case for private use of off-the-air taping in the home.2 De-
fendants argued that legislative history of the 1971 Sound Recording
Act, 6 the privacy of the home, and the publicness of the air waves
indicated that the implied exemption to private non-commercial off-
the-air taping should be extended by analogy to the videotape do-
main. " The 1971 amendment created for the first time a limited
copyright for sound recordings. The legsilative history indicated,
however, that the amendment was not to be extended to an individ-
ual taping a sound recording off the air for his private use.6 8 Since
that time, Congress has passed the 1976 Copyright Act which in-
cludes the express protection of sound recordings without specifi-
cally incorporating the 1971 legislative history to the 1976 Act.
60. Id. at 964-74. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 442-56
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
61. See 480 F. Supp. at 436-38.
62. Id. at 456. Even if the individual defendant was liable as direct infringer, the
District Court held that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringer on the
merits. Id. at 457.
63. Id. at 444-46.
64. Id. at 446-56.
65. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1981).
66. Id. at 967-68. See also Petition supra note 12.
67. The Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1, 85 Stat.
391 (1971)(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1 (f))(1976)(amended 1976).
68. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) reprinted in 4 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, at Appendix 18-1(1981).
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Should the implicit exemption for private, off-the-air audio taping
be extended by analogy to private videotaping?
The Court of Appeals refused to incorporate the legislative his-
tory of the now superseded 1971 Act in the current Act in a case
involving another medium and a different variety of copyrighted
work. 9 The court started with the basic assumption that the Copy-
right Act is designed to promote the public welfare by providing an
economic incentive to creators to produce works of authorship.70
The Act, unambiguous on its face, grants exclusive rights to copy-
right owners, and nothing in the 1971 legislative history covering
sound recordings suggests applicability to video works.7' To support
this proposition, the court gave several reasons why audiovisual
works should receive different judicial treatment. First, the Copy-
right Act places sound recordings and audiovisual works in separate
categories of copyrightable subject matter. It excludes audiovisual
works from exemptions set forth in sections 108(b), 110(1) and
112(a) of the Act.7" Thus, Congress has shown a special solicitude
for audiovisual works and a concern for their unauthorized repro-
duction which it has not shown for sound recordings. 78 This special
statutory treatment may reflect congressional concern about the
relatively large economic investment involved in creating audio-
visual works and their particular vulnerability to unauthorized
reproductions.7 '
69. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965-69 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 967.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 968.
73. Id. at 967.
74. For an excellent discussion of basic distinctions between audio and videotap-
ing and the applicability of the 1979 Act to imply an exemption to videotaping see
Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 61-
67 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Marsh]. Her basic arguments are the following:
First, the sound recording act was passed after audio taping was widespread and
too universal to control by statute, whereas videotaping is in its early stages. Second,
tape recorders and blank audio tapes have many more non-infringing uses at this
time than videotape whose overwhelming use is to copy television programming most
of which is copyrighted. Third, visual works have always been protected under the
1909 Act, whereas sound recordings enjoyed protection only by amendment in 1971.
Fourth, a distinction should be made between fair use and exemption. The latter
should only be confined by Congress which it has done in sections 107-18. Fifth, the
nature of the material indicates that the video audience is more easily undermined by
taping than the audio audience. The audio audience often listens to a tape hundreds
of times whereas the video's appetite for the work may be exhausted after a couple of
showings. Sixth, the costs of producing a movie are often much greater than produc-
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The Court of Appeals' rejection of an implied exemption to
copyright appears justified in light of the meticulous set of exemp-
tions specified in the current act. To engraft an implied exemption
on the 1976 Act, based on the now superceded 1971 amendments
and their legislative history, runs contrary to basic principles of stat-
utory interpretation. Nowhere in the legislative history of 1976 Act
is there any indication that the now superceded 1971 amendments
were to be incorporated in it. Moreover, it is by no means certain
that the audio exemption still stands, much less the video. In fact,
one important result of the Betamax case is that it may encourage
new judicial and legislative activity against off-the-air audio taping,
perhaps a much more pervasive and economically significant prac-
tice than videotaping.7 5 In all the Supreme Court should have no
difficulty in adopting the court of appeals' fundamentally sound rea-
soning on the implied exemption to copyright.
C. Fair Use
Having rejected the defendant's defense of the implied exemp-
tion for home videotaping, the Court of Appeals turned to the more
basic defense of fair use. In so doing, it reexamined the fundamental
nature of this doctrine, 76 now codified in Section 107 of the Copy-
right Act, and described as the most troublesome in copyright law. 77
The Supreme Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit's formulation of
fair use which would bring, for the first time, proper dimensions to
this difficult area of copyright law.
The scope of fair use, the privilege to use another's copyright
ing a sound recording. A movie producer's costs entail those for the screenplay, ac-
tors, scenery musicians with a greater need for wider copyright protection. Seventh,
nothing in legislative history suggests that the sound recording amendment was in-
tended to extend to video. The committee members were aware of this possibility but
chose not to do so.
75. For industry estimates on the extent of their injury by home audio taping,
see Warner Finds Home Tapers at 600 mil, Variety, March 31, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The
industry continues to lobby for specific legislation remedying the practice. See
NARM OK's Audio Tape Levy, Billboard, April 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1. See, e.g., S. 1758,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., § 120 (1982) which sets up a compulsory license for audio re-
cording twice and media subject to a tax on recording machines and blank tapes, the
proceeds of which are to be distributed to copyright owners through the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal.
76. Latman, supra note 2, at 203. Fair use is regarded as a defense to copyright
infringement for which the defendant has the burden of proof.
77. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT at § 13.05.
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work in a reasonable manner,"s is one of the great on-going debates
of copyright law. Fair use at times has been regarded as a minor or
de minimus invasion of the plaintiff's exclusive rights. But fair use
has a larger purpose consistent with the constitutional provision: to
promote science and the useful arts at the expense of the copyright
owner's expectancy award.7 9 The Court of Appeals' reexamination of
this equitable judge-made defense to copyright may prove to be a
signficant reformulation of the doctrine and a strengthening of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights despite the effect on new copying
technologies.
Section 107 provides no definition of fair use.80 Instead, it lists
four factors to determine whether the defense applies."s In enumer-
ating these factors, the legislative history gives little guidance on
what weight they should receive or how they interrelate. Moreover,
the legislative history indicates that the statute is neither intended
to narrow or enlarge the common law doctrine of fair use, but is a
restatement of the past practice and will continue to develop
through judicial interpretation. 2 Because the past judicial practice
involving fair use has been notoriously inconsistent and confusing,
the implication is that each case raising the defense will be decided
on its own facts.83
The latest case before Betamax applying fair use to the problem
of new technology, in a factual context similar to that of videotap-
ing, involved library photocopying. Like videotaping the new tech-
78. House Report, supra note 6, at 65.
79. For a discussion of the constitutional basis of fair use, see Rosenfield, The
Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 N.D.L. Rev. 790, 801-
02 (1975); Richards, The Value of the Copyright Clause in Construction of Copy-
right Law, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221 (1975).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979); See Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in
Copyright: The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y. 215, 215-60 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Seltzer].
81. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979).
82. House Report, supra note 6 at 65-66.
83. Fair use issues have arisen in a wide variety of situations. The factual con-
texts indicate that fair use will arise in those situations where the public interest in
greater access to the copyrighted work is greatest. E.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas.
26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136)(review and criticism); Berlin v. E.C. Publications,
329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964)(parody and satire); Williams & Wilkens Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afj'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)(library use);
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis. Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1968)(news);
Rosemont Enters v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1009 (1967)(works of scholarship).
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nology has made possible the photocopying revolution by allowing
low cost mass reproduction of copyrighted works and, like the VTR,
it has challenged the copyright owners' ability to control the use of
his written work. The full extent of this practice has not yet run its
course.
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United Statess4 the Court of
Claims held that the photocopying of an entire article from a spe-
cialized low circulation medical journal constituted fair use and not
copyright infringement. The defendant through its National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) and National Library of Medicine (NLM)
photocopied and distributed journal articles to those requesting
them."' Generally, the NIH and NLM limited requests to no more
than one article per journal, no more than fifty pages, and no more
than a single copy of an article per request.8" These restraints, how-
ever, were not satisfactory to the plaintiff, a publisher of medical
and scientific journals who claimed injury from the practice because
a relatively few lost subscriptions could make the difference between
overall profit and loss.87 In determining whether the millions of
pages photocopied by the NIH libraries constituted fair use, the
court was persuaded that the plaintiff had failed to prove that it
would be harmed in the future.
The dissent 8 for others" have criticized the opinion for failing to
distinguish between the extent of injury and liability. Under their
view the fair use defense is lost when the plaintiff can show harm to
the potential market or value of his work. Fair use determinations
should concentrate on the cumulative effect of wholesale photocopy-
ing by many persons similarly situated in the market rather than
84. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975)(per curiam).
85. Id. at 1347.
86. Id. at 1349.
87. Id. at 1347.
88. Id. at 1363-86.
89. 3 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 13.05[E], at 13-84 (1981). Nimmer questions the
strength of precedential value of Williams & Wilkens for future federal court deci-
sions as compared with the older decision, Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.
1962), in which the defendant school teacher, in making an arrangement of a copy-
righted song and reproducing it 48 times for his class, was guilty of infringement and
denied the fair use defense. Nimmer's argument is that Williams & Wilkens, affirmed
by a 4-4 decision in the Supreme Court, does not constitute binding authority on
other courts and that faced with a conflict between the Court of Claims and the
Court of Appeals, "formal considerations suggest that other federal courts will follow
the Court of Appeals." Id. at 13-89.
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concentrating on the particular activities of one defendant. Fair use
is generally limited to the use of one work to create another, but it is
not an intrinsic use of a work, a use for which the work was in-
tended, one which replaces the need for the original work. Despite
these forceful arguments, the court in Williams & Wilkins favored
the users of copyrighted works who were scientists and physicians,
based on the view that the progress of science would otherwise be
impeded. 0
By contrast the Ninth Circuit in Betamax rejected the Williams
& Wilkins approach to fair use in what may be a significant new
direction in fair use analysis, favoring authors over users. The court
began with a statement on what it believed to be the general orien-
tation of fair use pointing to the preamble to section 107 which pro-
vides an illustrative list of examples where fair use typically arises
such as: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, "'scholar-
ship or research."91 Citing a work by Leon Seltzer 2 , it emphasized
that these illustrative purposes show fair use to involve a use by
second author of a first author's work to create an independent
work. Videotapers, however, are not making an independent use of
the work but are merely reproducing the work for its intrinsic pur-
pose, its ordinary use, which is to view it more conveniently. Thus, a
use involving an instantaneous reproduction of a work for the same
purpose as the original is contrary to the rationale of fair use which
is essentially limited to the "productive" use of another work for
purposes such as criticism or comment and other uses involved in
creating an independent work."
The Court of Appeals' approach to fair use differs vastly from
that espoused in Williams & Wilkins and the district court which
apply fair use case-by-case, particularly when technological change
has rendered literal application of the statute unworkable.'4 This
approach creates a presumption for wider public access when faced
90. Section 108 of the Copyright Act specifically exempts certain types of photo-
copying by qualifying libraries and archives. But if the library either exceeds the
scope of section 108 or does not qualify, the general fair use defense may still be
available. See 17 U.S.C. § 108.
91. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th
Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 970.
93. Seltzer, supra note 80 at 237.




with technological change,9 5 even though it might frustrate a copy-
right owner's expectation of a greater monopoly award than a more
literal interpretation of the statutory language. According to the
Court of Appeals, this result oriented case-by-case resolution of fair
use invades the domain of the Congress, the proper institution to
rearrange the expectations of copyright owners in creating statutory
exemptions to copyright similar to those in sections 108 through 118
of the 1976 Act." In sum, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
attempted a comprehensive definition of fair use: the productive use
of one work to create another independent work.
Thus, starting from different premises about the nature of copy-
right, it is hardly surprising that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
came to different conclusions in applying each of the four fair use
factors in section 107. As for the purpose and character of the use, it
rejected a commercial, non-commercial distinction.9 7 Even though
videotapers do not make commercial use of a work, their use does
not constitute educational or scientific use but is merely for en-
tertainment and convenience.98 Here, unlike Williams & Wilkins,
there is no concern that absent a fair use defense, scientific research
will be impeded.
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, also miti-
gated against finding fair use." Unlike Williams & Wilkins, which
involved the use of informational works in scientific journals, the
works in Betamax were designed for entertainment, and therefore
supported no valid fair use purpose. There is less need for public
access to works of entertainment. The court of appeals was not per-
suaded that the medium of expression, the public airwaves, or
method of distribution, to the private home, indicated fair use. The
95. Id. at 448.
96. 659 F.2d at 971.
97. Id. at 972. Other cases have recognized that non-commercial use does not
necessarily constitute fair use. See Withol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note 89, § 13.05[E], at 13-58. On the other hand, just because the use
is commercial does not preclude the defense of fair use. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
98. 659 F.2d at 972. Generally, courts have found commercial exploitation a sig-
nificant factor in denying a fair use defense. See, e.g., Iowa State University Research
Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980); DC
Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
99. Unavailability of out-of-print works has been a rationale for asserting the
defense of fair use. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,
626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); but see Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1977). The court was apprently unpersuaded by viewing unavailability in Betamax.
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plaintiffs did not create a presumption of fair use by voluntarily
transmitting their programming over the public airwaves and com-
ingling their works with those in the public domain such as news
and sports.100
The third factor in section 107, the amount and substance of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a work, ran
clearly in plaintiffs favor.'01 Until Williams & Wilkins, one could
reject a claim of fair use if the entire work was reproduced because
excessive copying would preclude a finding of fair use. 0 2 Cleary, the
more substantial the taking, the less the availability of fair use. Al-
though copying an entire work will not per se defeat fair use because
all factors must be considered, it weights heavily against the asser-
tion of the defense.
Perhaps the most important fair use consideration is the fourth
factor, the effect of use on the potential market for the work.' It is
here that the difference between the court of appeals and the dis-
trict court becomes most apparent. The district court viewed this
factor as a surrogate for the extent of damages, finding that harm
caused by Betamax was too speculative, and may have even in-
creased the value of plaintiff's market by enlarging the audience due
to the machine's time shifting ability. The court of appeals started
with a much more extensive depiction of market effect: "It is clear
that home users assign economic value to their ability to have con-
trol over access to copyrighted works. The copyright laws would
seem to require that the copyright owner be given the opportunity
to exploit this market."'01 4 In addition, the appellate court con-
fronted the most difficult problem in this case, the extreme difficulty
for the copyright owner to prove harm from the activities of specific
defendants. Here the court was greatly influenced by Professor Nim-
mer's' 5 critique of Williams & Wilkins, that the court did not pay
100. 659 F.2d at 972.
101. Id. at 973.
102. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 13.05[D], at 13-72; see also Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ.
Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. N.Y. 1978).
103. One commentator has termed the fourth factor hardly more than a rhetori-
cal flourish for the test is entirely circular. "Whether a use will affect 'the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work' necessarily turns on whether the use will
be proscribed." See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 780.
104. 659 F.2d at 974.
105. ". . . it is a mistake to view this factor, as do some courts, as merely
raising the question of the extent of damages to plaintiff caused by the particu-
Spring 19821
TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
proper attention to the cumulative effect of mass production of
copyrighted works made possible by video recorders. Thus, the full
scope of infringing activity must be considered; otherwise copyright
owners would have insurmountable obstacles in proving harm to the
value of their works.
In sum, the Betamax case, is perhaps the first major case dealing
with the new copying technology,106 the court has chosen to return
to a narrower more traditional standard for fair use. It has limited
Williams & Wilkins to library photocopying where an article is be-
ing used for education or research. It has indicated that the illustra-
tive list of fair use contexts in section 107 refers to the essential
nature of the defense: productive use, the use of another's work to
produce one's own independent creation. In so doing it has rejected
a more ad hoc balancing approach in which the plaintiff's exclusive
rights and expectancy of the monopoly award are weighed against
the public interest in greater access to the copyrighted works.
C. Contributory Infringement
Liability for contributory infringement is imposed on those who
improperly facilitate the use of copyrighted works. This principle is
recognized under Section 106 of the Copyright Act, in which an
owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to authorize the repro-
duction, adaptation, performance, and display of the copyrighted
work.1 0 7 The phrase "to authorize" establishes the principle of con-
tributory infringement as being material aid given to the primary
infringer in the illegal activity. In Betamax, the Court found direct
or primary infringement in the acts committed by the individual
lar activities of the defendant. This factor rather poses the issue of whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
whether in fact engaged in by the defendant or by others) would result in a
substantially adverse impact on the potential market for or value of the plain-
tiff's work."
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 13.05[B] at 13-62.
106. Before Betamax the most significant off-the-air taping case was Encyclopae-
dia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. N.Y. 1978), where de-
fendant corporations had videotaped a number of copyrighted films and distributed
them to public school districts. The district court issued a preliminary injunction de-
spite defendant's claim of disruption of public education if the practice was enjoined.
The court refused to accept the defense of fair use, and distinguished Crooks from
Williams & Wilkins on the basis of the substantiality of the copying and the harmful
effect on plaintiffs market which outweighed the non-commercial educational pur-
pose of the copying. Id. at 251.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
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who had taped the television program and held Sony, the manufac-
turer of Betamax, liable as a contributory infringer. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's finding of liability of the Sony Corporation, the manufacturer,
on a theory of contributory infringement, is a significant extension
of the law in this domain. The court of appeals expansive applica-
tion of the doctrine of contributory infringement is a serious flaw in
an otherwise well reasoned opinion. The Supreme Court should not
adopt the Ninth Circuit's reformulation of this doctrine as retarda-
tion in the development of valuable replicative technologies might
follow.
Copyright law, in perhaps less-developed form than patent law,
has imposed liability for infringement to one who knowingly in-
duces, causes, or aids another's infringement.1 8 An individual need
not directly supervise or even have an immediate financial interest
in the infringing activities to be held liable as a contributory in-
fringer if his activities aid the primary infringer in accomplishing
the illegal result.10 9
Once direct infringement is found, a contributory infringer must
have knowledge of the infringing activity and he must have materi-
ally aided or induced the infringing activity.1 0 As for knowledge, the
court of appeals noted that the contributory infringer need only
have knowledge of the infringing activities but not that these activi-
ties as a matter of law constitute copyright infringement."' Thus,
uncertainty in the law cannot be used as a defense to contributory
infringement. The court of appeals easily found this knowledge from
Sony's advertisements and promotion of Betamax and the fact that
the machine was primarily sold to reproduce television program-
ming. A presumption of knowledge arose from the circumstances of
the sale of Betamax as well as its ordinary, intended, and predict-
able use-for the purpose of infringement.' 2
The second element in finding contributory infringement is ma-
terial aid or inducement of the infringing activity.'" Again, the
court of appeals was particularly persuaded by the content of the
108. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377 U.S.
476; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)(Supp. III 1979).
109. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 12.04[A], at 12-33.
110. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
111. 659 F.2d at 975. Under copyright law, a defendant's innocence does not ab-
solve him of liability; it only affects the remedies available.
112. Id.
113. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 12.041A], at 13.
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defendant's advertising which clearly encouraged the infringing ac-
tivities. 1 4 In so doing the court rejected a doctrine recognized in
patent law, which limits the doctrine of contributory infringement
when a staple article of commerce, an item which has substantial
non-infringing uses, is involved.
In patent law, whether the staple article of commerce limitation
applies in a particular case will depend on the extent of the article's
noninfringing uses." 5 For example, under this doctrine, one who
provides a typewriter to another with the knowledge that it may be
used for infringement would not be held liable for contributory in-
fringement so long as he did not commit acts of active inducement.
The rationale for this limitation is economic efficiency, a reluctance
to hamper the sales of useful articles and hold manufacturers liable
as contributory infringers whenever they knew that some purchasers
will use the item to infringe. But even under patent law, the seller or
provider of a staple article may yet be an infringer if he has actively
induced an infringer by advertising instruction or directions on a
label.'
The court of appeals believed that the "staple item" limitation
was inappropriate in the Betamax case because Betamax machines
are used to tape little else but copyrighted television programs and
Sony's advertising clearly was directed to this use." 7 Thus, Sony was
held liable as a contributory infringer even though Betamax and
VTR already have some non-infringing uses, such as the recording
of non-copyrighted material off the air, the playback of pre-recorded
tapes, and the production of one's own material in conjunction with
a video camera. If the price of the video camera becomes greatly
reduced, this predominant use for off-the-air taping may not prevail
for very long. The current extent of those non-infringing uses is mi-
114. 659 F.2d at 975.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) states:
"Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such pat-
ent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
non-infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer."
Id.
To determine what constitutes a staple article, case law suggests the non-infring-
ing use must be substantial and not merely speculative or experimental. See Johnson
& Johnson v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 704 (D. Del. 1977).
116. See, e.g., Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963).
117. 659 F.2d at 975.
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nor when compared with the predominant use of Betamax to tape
copyrighted works. In the near future, the major use of VTR may
consist in making home movies and, at that time, the staple goods
argument may have much more validity.
The Supreme Court should not adopt the Ninth Circuit's expan-
sive application of contributory infringement. Such an expansion of
this doctrine, which would have wide ranging and perhaps adverse
effects on competition, is not reflected in precedent. In other leading
contributory infringement cases, as compared with Betamax, the de-
fendant provided non-inherently infringing equipment but actively
induced the infringing activity short of actually committing the
physical acts of infringement himself.118 The level of culpability in
these cases is quite high: a person in defendant's position would
have easily recognized the illegal nature of his activities, and unlike
Sony the defendants produced nothing of value to society in the
form of new technology. In these cases illegality imposed no penal-
ties on the consumer and the contributory infringers were basically
scoundrels.
Betamax is unique in its finding of contributory infringement by
a manufacturer who provides equipment to the general public with
the knowledge that it will be used by some to reproduce copyrighted
works even though the manufacturer did not know the particular
defendants or that these acts of reproduction would constitute in-
fringement as a matter of law. Clearly, liability to contributory in-
fringement should apply where a manufacturer specially constructs
a device for a particular defendant with knowledge about the in-
tended use of the device. But liability under this doctrine should not
be extended to manufacturers of new and useful replicative technol-
ogies which have a variety of non infringing uses, even though an
indeterminate class of unknown defendants may use this same tech-
nology to infringe copyright. Far reaching regulation of new technol-
ogies should be left to the legislative process.
What should be done while the legislative process takes place?
118. For example, in Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records,
Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), an advertising agency, whose client made
unauthorized recordings of plaintiff's songs, by preparing advertiements, answering
telephones, filling orders, was held liable as a contributory infringer. Here, the defen-
dant had a close connection with the music piracy business, participating in and fur-
thering this endeavor. Similarly, the court found contributory infringement in Elektra
Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. N.Y. 1973), where defen-
dant's stores sold blank tapes and for a fee loaned shoppers copyrighted musical
works on phonorecords so that their clients could record the tapes. See also Universal
Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
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The Supreme Court should enjoin the active inducement of infringe-
ment by advertisement. Accordingly, Betamax machines should
prominently carry a warning against the use of the machines for in-
fringement purposes. The court should stop at this point because
major adjustments of the forces of competition is the domain of
Congress not the courts. Currently, Congress is considering several
Betamax bills, the most important of which involves a complex reg-
ulatory format to solve the videotaping problem. Whatever remedy
is eventually provided either by the judiciary or Congress, must be
based on the nature and extent of harm to video markets posed by
VTRs.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY: Nature of Harm Posed by the
Continuing Use of VTR
In applying the proper remedy, whether damages or the novel
continuing royalty the district court or ultimately Congress, must
determine the nature and extent of the actual harm to the market
for the copyrighted work caused by the use of the VTR." 9 In gen-
eral, the origin of the harm, which will evolve almost exclusively
from the recording capacity of the VTR, is easy to pinpoint, but the
extent of this harm, if any, is highly speculative and
indeterminate. 1 20
Paradoxically, the VTR recording capacity may actually increase
the value of the copyrighted work by allowing a group of individuals
to view television programming who would not otherwise have the
opportunity to do so. The reason for this paradox lies in the nature
of television which is a medium of advertising whereby broadcasters
sell audience to advertisers who pay according to the size of the au-
dience delivered. To determine audience size, rating agencies con-
duct surveys periodically. Thus, a popular program with an exten-
sive mass audience commands a high rate from the advertiser. VTRs
allow time shifting the ability to watch a program at a time other
than when it is transmitted, and may offer a means to increase audi-
ence size, providing copyright owners with a new source for advertis-
ing revenue. By its capacity to provide short term convenience, the
VTR enhances the market for the copyright owner."2 '
119. Universal Studios v. Sony, 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. See generally, Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52
So. CAL. L. REV. 573, 578-83, 611-17 (1979).
121. See generally, B. OWEN, J. BEEBE, & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 4
(1974).
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Balanced againt these market enhancing attributes is the library-
ing of programs, the principal threat posed by VTR to video mar-
kets. Librarying is the making and retaining of copies for future
viewing, damaging rerun audiences and the subsidiary rental and
sale markets for prerecorded tapes. 122 Copyright owners fear that a
multitude of videotapers would dissipate a rerun audience, the after
theater market, for a show like "Gone With the Wind" by perform-
Rating services include VTR use in their survey data. Advertisers pay for these
extra viewers. The increased audience is directly related to the amount of VTR use
which can do nothing but increase the value of the copyrighted work. See The Home
Recording Act of 1982: Hearings on Amendment 1333 to S. 1758 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Charles Ferris at 2)
[hereinafter cited as Ferris Statement.
Both meters and diaries are used by rating services to determine audience size. A
sample number of television households is chosen who either have meters attached to
their television tuners counting the exact television programs watched or are inter-
viewed afterward by the diary method. In any event, a programs rating is based on
the number of viewers watching the program and takes into account time shifting.
See The Home Recording Act of 1982: Hearings on Amendment 1333 to S. 1758
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Nina
Cornell, president, Cornell, Pelcovits and Brenner Economists, Inc.) [hereinaater
cited as Cornell Statement].
Others have argued that VTR use will not raise the number of viewers watching
television but only redistributes the viewing because there is only so much time in the
day to watch television. Advertisers will pay less for VTR viewers because statistics
on replays, which cannot be measured by automatic metering devices, are less accu-
rate. Even more fundamental, advertisers are interested in reaching a particular audi-
ence at a particular time. For example, a florist will not be as interested in a replay
audience viewing his advertisement after Mother's Day. In addition, there is always
the threat that the advertisement will be deleted by pause devices. See The Home
Recording Act of 1982: Hearings on Amendment 1333 to S. 1758 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)(statement of Jay Eliasberg, former vice
president, Research, CBS Broadcast Group) [hereinafter cited as Eliasberg
Statement].
122. The Copyright Office has compiled a chart comparing studies done on the
type of practices performed by owners of VTR which could affect video markets. The
studies commissioned by the movie industry indicated that most VTR owners' time
shift (75.4.',. time shift, 75/, library 15 tapes or less and 23"i substantial libraries,
Fields Research Corp. for MCA, July, 1978; 52% time shift,31.2% library, 16.8%
both, Mediastat for MPAA, May, 1980; 96% time shift, Crossley for Sony, August,
1978; 68("* time shifting of public T.V. programs with little evidence of librarying of
public T.V. shows, Public Broadcasting Survey, Spring, 1979). But thre is a certain
amount of librarying performed. But one must keep in mind that the results vary
according to which industry group commissioned the survey. See The Home Record-
ing Act of 1982: Hearings on Amendment 1333 to S. 1758 Before the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)(statement of David Ladd, Register of Copy-
rights, at Appendix I [hereinafter cited as Ladd Statement].
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ing the work over and over to family and friends. 2 ' With the size of
the rerun audience diminished, the advertiser would naturally pay
less for such programming. In addition, librarying of works may
damage the valuable rental and sale subsidiary markets to the de-
gree that audio taping has. 24
Despite this fear, the extent of damage due to librarying is prob-
ably not that great. Currently, with the cost of tape at a minimum of
$12-9 for one hour, the extent of librarying, although the practice
may exist to some degree, is economically prohibitive for most peo-
ple. Even if tape prices decline somewhat, the cost advantage of the
rental market will compete with individual librarying, not to men-
123. Even though the rating services take into account VTR taping to determine
audience size for which advertisers will pay, such is not the case when subscriber (pay
TV) is involved. Here the copyright owner is directly injured in rental and rerun
markets because subscriber TV is primarily interested in the number of subscribers,
not the size of the audience. In this context, home taping clearly devalues the copy-
righted work. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 13.15[F], at 13-96. The Chairman of
the Executive Committee of Walt Disney Productions testified:
• . . the phenomenal sales of blank cassettes convinces us that people do build
archives of our films. Take for instance when "Gone With the Wind" was first
televised after introduction of the home video recorder by Sony in 1976. There
was a virtual black market of blank videotapes before the showing of that clas-
sic picture. The news media reported that VCRs and blank tapes had been sold
out. Those tapes were purchased for archival retention, not mere "time
shifting."
The Home Recording Act of 1982: Hearings on Amendment 1333 to S. 1758 Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Donn B.
Tatum, Chairman, Executive Committee of Walt Disney Productions).
124. Industry estimates of the market value of audio taping using a median price
of 6.27 dollars per album is approximately 2.85 billion dollars. See WARNER COMMUNI-
CATIONS INC., A CONSUMER HOME TAPING 24 (1982). Companion legislation has also
been introduced to remedy the practice of audio taping paralleling the legislation
designed to provide copyright owner's compensation for videotaping. See, e.g., S.
1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 120 (1982). Because of the particular vulnerability of the
audiovisual work, off-the-air taping may present in the long run a greater threat to
their production than audio taping. For example, the industry has testified that
"[tihe average total investment in a motion picture is some $20 million. Eight out of
ten films do not recoup their investment from theatrical exhibition. Six out of ten
films never recoup their investment, period." The Home Recording Legislation of
1982: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., at
11) [hereinafter cited as Valenti Testimony] See also supra note 74. Does the con-
sumer really want to library movies as the audio tape, builds up a library to listen
over and over to his favorite pieces of music? Or is the desire to see a movie ex-
hausted after a few showings? Supporters of VTR argue that it is unrealsitic that
videotapers will accommodate large quantities of tapes for future viewing. See Ferris
Statement, supra note 121, at 14.
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tion competition with videodiscs which sell and rent at lower prices
than cassette tapes. 25 The potential librarying threat, however, is
substantial and may become a tangible problem in the future, which
calls for close monitoring.
Another type of harm undermining the advertising audience is
also related to librarying. This is presented by pause devices which
could permit a viewer to delete advertising or use the fast forward
device to speed up the commercial. Again, whether significant harm
has resulted from the practice of advertising deletion is doubtful. No
machine has been devised to automatically delete advertising with-
out viewer participation. The viewer must see the advertising at
least once-even at the faster speed. Erasure of advertising, how-
ever, cannot be regarded a major problem because of the time and
inconvenience it takes to accomplish the task, particularly when
coupled with the basic cost of the tape to be kept for librarying
purposes.12 6
A third variety of future harm associated with the VTR involves
the interference with a rating service ability to determine the size of
the viewing audience. 127 If the rating service cannot take into ac-
125. The price depends on whether it is for a VHS or Beta format. The VHS is
somewhat more expensive: $12 per hour for VHS, $9 for Beta. For a 4-1/2 hour cas-
sette the prices are $23 and $22 respectively. CONSUMER RE. May 10, 1982, at 232.
These prices are list prices and an informal survey in the Toledo, Ohio area reveals
considerably lower prices for videotapes. The price of a prerecorded videodisc at
about $20 is less than $22 for a 4-1/2 hour video cassette and the disc contains a
prerecorded movie whereas the cassette buyer will have to tape his own off the televi-
sion set. Videodisc makers are currently expanding their catalog to 400 titles. See
Lachenbruch, A Buyer's Guide to Videodisc Players, T.V. Guide, March 6, 1982, at
40.
The question remains whether the product taped from the television will be con-
sidered a good library item. These movies are edited for televison, riddled with adver-
tisements, and are often of poor quality. This combined with the high price of video-
tape will not doubt deter many from retaining their copies any length of time before
the tape is erased and used for something else. Ferris Statement, supra note 121 at
12. But the ultimate amount of librarying will depend on the future price of tape.
126. The extent of advertisement erasure is even more speculative than that of
librarying. The Copyright Office has compiled results of various studies on the prac-
tice. Studies commissioned by the motion picture industry show a degree of adver-
tisement deletion: 58.3 eliminate sometimes rarely or never, 56.1 pass sometimes
rarely or never (Field's Research Corp. for MCA, June, 1978); 83.1% while recording
or playback delete or avoid, (Media Stat for MPAA, May, 1980). The Sony Study
Conducted by Crossley, August, 1978 showed that 25% use fast foreward through
commercials. Ladd Statement, supra note 122 at Appendix II.
127. Statistics lend themselves to differing interpretations. For example, the Me-
dia Stat Survey indicated that when asked the question, "Do you delete commer-
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count the extended audience provided by VTR time-shifting capac-
ity, the VTR has hurt the copyright owner in that he is not compen-
sated for this audience.' 8 Both Arbitron and Neilson, the two
majors rating agencies, take into account the use of VTR. The use of
VTR may complicate audience measurement but there is no reason
to believe that it will significantly distort the ratings.129
In sum, due to the ambiguous nature of the harm presented by
VTR, the Supreme Court or the district court will have great diffi-
culty in determining an appropriate remedy to compensate the cop-
yright owner for the infringement.
V. THE INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
Once infringement is proved, the Copyright Act generously pro-
vides the copyright plaintiff with a choice of remedies. 30 The copy-
right owner may recover actual damages resulting from the infringe-
ment and the infringer's profits attributable to the infringement
that are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.' 3 '
Instead of actual damages and profits, the copyright owner may also
choose statutory damages which provide a range of minimum and
maximum awards, assessed at the discretion of the court. 132 Nor-
cials?" 87% said that they had. This 87% was not of all VCR viewers but those 23%
who view the program while recording it. But most people do not watch and tape at
the same time. The Mediastat also did not take into account how often the practice
of deletion took place. After all, advertisement deletion is performed by all of us
when we leave the room for the duration of the "commercial message." The Home
Recording Legislation of 1982; Hearing on Amendment 1333 to S. 1758 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm. 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)(statement of Eugene H. Kum-
mel, Chairman, McCann-Erickson at 5-6).
128. See Eliasberg Statement, supra note 121.
129. See Cornell Statement, supra note 121; Ferris Statement, supra note 121.
130. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-10 (Supp. II 1979).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III 1979).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (Supp. III 1979). The range of recovery is limited from
$250 to $10,000 except for willful infringement where the court may increase the
award to not more than $50,000. The range is decided at the broad discretion of the
court without requiring extensive evidence of actual damages or profits.
Generally statutory damages are provided because actual damages earned through
infringement may be too difficult to determine, and infringers often do not make
profits from their infringing activities. The statutory damage remedy has always been
extended to past infringement and the remedy is usually coupled with an injunction
against the infringer to cease the infringing activities.
In Betamax statutory damage would not constitute an appropriate measure of re-
lief for much the same reasons that actual damages and profits are not appropriate.
THE BETAMAX CASE
mally, a recovery of damages and profits or statutory damages is ac-
companied by a permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants
from future infringing activities.
Clearly, a permanent injunction"' issued against Sony would
cause great public injury and destroy a valuable new technology in
the name of copyright infringement.1 3 4 In addition, the damage rem-
edy is completely inadequate in the context of Betamax: both actual
damages and profits or statutory damages, if limited to the activities
of the specific direct infringer, are trivial. On the other hand the
damage to future markets caused by the Betamax are speculative
and indeterminate.
Recognizing these difficulties, the court of appeals suggested that
a continuing royalty may be appropriate where a permanent injunc-
tion would cause great public injury.8 5 No court has yet applied this
novel remedy to a copyright case. 36 The method of determining the
amount of royalty and the way in which royalty proceeds would be
distributed to copyright owners would involve great difficulties per-
haps taking years to accomplish. But the possibility a judicially
fashioned compulsory license may prove to be the most remarkable
result of the Betamax case.
If the traditional remedies of damages and permanent injunction
are inadequate, the Supreme Court or on remand the district court
Because the case involved only one infringement, even if the statutory maximum
were assessed, this would constitute a trivial sum compared with what the plaintiffs
would deem an adequate measure of recovery. This, of course, would not preclude
future lititation involving other infringements. Such litigation would be an unfortu-
nate result of the Betamax, involving enormous policing and administrative costs in
which copyright owners would see perhaps very little of recoveries won. As a by-prod-
uct it would also force the copyright owners in their policing efforts to invade the
privacy of homes in pursuit of infringers.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. III 1979) provides for the granting of temporary
and final injunctions as the court deems necessary to restrain infringement of
copyright.
134. Lagore Testimony, supra note 43 at 11-12.
135. Universal Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 964, 976 (9th Cir.
198L).
136. The closest provision in the Copyright Act of 1976 involves the effect of
omission of notice on innocent infringers, 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (Supp. III 1979), which
provides for a reasonable license fee fixed at the discretion of the court in the case
where an infringer proves that he was innocently mislead by lack of copyright notice.
Section 405, however, is of dubious applicability to the Betamax case. This section is
aimed at an infringement of a single work and not a future infringement, which would
hardly be termed innocent infringement, in which the infringer relied on a copy for
which notice had been omitted.
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might consider ordering modification of the VTR to avoid its most
objectionable feature, namely, its recording capacity to create a sim-
ple playback machine."'7 This solution creates the worst of all possi-
ble worlds. Such a decree would be economically inefficient, penaliz-
ing the public by depriving it of a valuable new technology which
because of its playback capacity may become increasingly more use-
ful. Even if these technological modifications were feasible, they
would seriously damage the market for the VTR, placing it at a dis-
advantage against the lower priced videodisc. In addition, they
would destroy the flexibility of the VTR and the possibility of its
future development for non-infringing activities which rely on
replay, pause, and permanent recordation capacity. The popularity
of VTR indicates that people will buy the machines with these fea-
tures from a bootlegging source that would develop to meet the de-
mand. Turning back the technological clock would suppress the de-
velopment of a valuable new technology and perhaps dedicate
society's resources to policing illegal bootlegging activities.
None of the above remedies, traditional or novel,138 constitutes
an adequate response to the challenge of VTR. A legislative solution
is mandated.
VI. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A. A Judicially Crafted Compulsory License
Resolution of the problem of home videotaping calls for a legisla-
tive solution rather than an adjudicated one. As the district court
137. Suggested by Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 83-85 (1981).
138. Another even more drastic form of non-monetary relief is the impoundment
remedy. The Copyright Act specifically provides for the impounding and ultimate
destruction of infringing articles and of all means of making them, 17 U.S.C. § 503
(Supp. III 1979). Within the scope of this provision are included blank tape and re-
cording equipment. The decision to issue an impounding order is discretionary with
the court. Impounding orders, however, have been denied absent extraordinary
circumstances.
Although a possible option, the district court should in its discretion not adopt the
impounding remedy. The economic impact on the same 25,000 retail outlets selling
VTRs and blank tape would be disastrous. The order would apply to Sony as the only
defendant manufacturer in the suit while the other brands of VTR would continue to
be used. Further problems would involve the three million American homes already
using VTR. The court should reject the impoundment remedy when faced with its
practical difficulties, fundamental unfairness, and its eventual result of total suppes-
sion of a useful new technology. See Lagore Statement, supra note 43.
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stated, "[tihe ramifications of this new technology are greater than
the boundaries of this lawsuit. A court reviewing the limited claims
of specified parties in a particular factual setting cannot and should
not undertake the role of a government commission or legislative
body exploring and evaluating all the uses and consequences of the
videotape recorder."' 39 A system of compulsory license, a royalty tax
on the hardware and software of videotape and its manner of distri-
bution can only be determined after the many factors, economic and
social, are considered and adjusted according to the needs of con-
sumers, the producers of machines, and the copyright owners. A
broad policy approach by a legislature fitting all the pieces of the
puzzle into an organized whole is vastly superior to the piecemeal
approach of adjudication, particularly when the harm evolving from
even massive use of VTR is at best speculative. 40
Professor Nimmer, whose advocacy for a continuing royalty was
persuasive to the court, analogized the remedy to the real property
domain where courts, to avoid public harm, have issued a judicially
crafted compulsory license."" But the analogy fails because the
problem could not be resolved in one lawsuit covering one piece of
property owned by an individual person. 14 2 The harm by public use
of real property is less speculative, the trespassing easier to
determine. 43
Unlike a parcel of land, however, the variety of copyrighted
works broadcast over public airwaves is infinitely greater, the actual
harm to the copyright owner is not clear, and the amount of in-
fringement is difficult to determine and impossible to police. 44 If a
continuing royalty were assessed, an elaborate distribution system
would have to be constructed involving continuous supervision by
regulatory decree which the courts are ill-suited to enforce. To re-
139. Universal Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 442 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 119-28.
141. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 13.05[F], at 13-91.
142. To support his analogy Nimmer cites several real property cases, e.g., Harri-
sonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Quality Excelsior Coal Co.
v. Reeves, 206 Ark. 713, 177 S.W.2d 729 (1944).
143. For example, in Cox v. City of New York, 265 N.Y. 411, 193 N.E. 251
(1934), the court awarded damages instead of an injunction where a railroad had im-
properly constructed bridges, but honestly believed it had obtained an easement to
the land. Here, the cost of restoration would greatly exceed the value of the rights
invaded.
144. For the peculiar nature of copyrighted works and the protection of public
goods see infra text accompanying notes 15-24.
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duce transaction costs copyright owners would probably devise a
clearinghouse method of distribution as in the performance rights
for sound recordings. 4 5 Such combinations have raised serious anti-
trust problems which seem to persist despite efforts of resolution.' 46
In sum, the complexity of the interests, the multitude of the par-
ties, the elaborate distributional machinery, and legal uncertainty
will necessitate a regulatory decree calling for continuing court su-
pervision. Such decrees have been proven to be unsatisfactory and
should only be considered as a method of last resort. All this indi-
cates a particular need for a legislative solution. Accordingly,
breathing space is needed whereby Congress may implement a
mechanism flexible enough to adjust the needs of copyright owners
while protecting the consumer interest in enjoying the benefits of
valuable new technology.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court should enjoin the active
inducement of infringement by advertisement 17 or during all
Betamax machines to carry a warning to all users against the use of
machines for infringement purposes. Hopefully, Congress will soon
provide a proper legislatie remedy to resolve the threat posed by
VTR to the healthy output of copyrighted works.
B. Legislative Proposals
Congress is considering several legislative proposals to remedy
the problem of off-the-air taping for private purposes. 48 One legisla-
tive solution would simply exempt the practice from copyright in-
fringement.' 49 The other would establish a compulsory license for
145. See INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A COPY-
RIGHT CLEARINGHOUSE (1977).
146. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979). See Hartnick, The Network Blanket License Triumphant: the Fourth Round
of the ASCAP-BMI-CBS Litigation, 2 COM. & LAW 49 (Fall 1980); Timberg, The
Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment
of 1950, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 294 (1954).
147. Suggested also by Field, Reflections on the Betamax Decisions, 22 IDEA 265
(1981).
148. For a summary of the legislative proposals and industry arguements see
Holsendolph, Tax Plan for Video Recording Gear, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1982, at 24,
col. 4.
149. S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) states:
§ 119. Limitation on exclusive rights:
Exemption for certain video recordings notwithstanding the provisions of
section 106, it is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to record
copyrighted works on a video recorder if-
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home taping while imposing a royalty on the sale of each VTR ma-
chine and tape.150 Compared to the total exemption, the administra-
(1) the recording is made for a private use; and
(2) the recording is not used in a commercial nature.
150. Amend. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) states as follows:
§ 119. Limitation on liability: Video recording
(a) HOME VIDEO RECORDING.-Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106(1), an individual who makes a single video recording of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work in his or her private home is exempt from any liability
for infringement of copyright if the video recording is for the private use of
that individual or members of his or her immediate household.
(b) COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR VIDEO RECORDING DEVICES AND MEDIA.-
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(1), the importation into
and distribution in the United States, and the manufacture and distribution in
the United States, of any video recording device or video recording medium
shall be subject of compulsory licensing if the importer or manufacturer of the
device or medium records the notice, and deposits the statement of account
and royalties, specified by this clause.
(A) The importer or manufacturer shall, at least one month before
the distribution in the United States of any video recording device or
any video recording medium or within sixty days after the effective date
of this Act, whichever is later, record with the Register of Copyrights
(hereinafter 'the Register') a notice including a statement of its identity
and address and a description of any trade or business names, trade-
marks, or like indicia that it uses in connection with the importation,
manufacture or distribution of video recording devices and video record-
ing media in the United States, and threafter, from time to time, such
further information as the Register, after consultation with the Copy-
right royalty Tribunal (hereinafter the 'Tribunal'), shall prescribe by
regulation to carry out the purpose of this clause.
(B) The importer or manufacterer shall deposit with the Register,
at such times, for such periods, and in accordance with such require-
ments that the Register shall, after consultation with the Tribunal, pre-
scribe by regulation, a statement of account, covering the pertinent pe-
riod next preceding, specifying the number of video recording devices
and amount of video recording media imported into or manufactured in
the United States during such period, and the number and distributed
in the United States during such period, together with such other infor-
mation, and in such form, content and manner, as the Register shall,
after consultation with the Tribunal, from time to time prescribe by
regulation.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (1) of this subsection,
the importation into and distribution in the United States, or the manu-
facture and distribution in the United States, of any video recording
device or video recording medium is actionable as an act of infringement
under section 501, and fully subject to the remedies provided by sections
502 through 506, 509, and 511, if the notice, statement of account, or
royalty specified by clause (1) of this subsection has not been recorded
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tion of a compulsory license and the collection and distribution of
royalties will involve great expense and complications, but it is pref-
erable to total exemption, because of the substantial potential threat
which VTR poses for the copyright owner.5'°
The argument for total exemption has a short-run appeal. Sup-
porters of a complete exemption for videotaping point to the more
than adequate remuneration copyright owners already obtain from
the sale of their audiovisual works. These include the showing of the
or deposited and such failure was willful or repeated, or if the statement
of account or royalty does not materially comply with the requirements
of clause (1) or any regulations prescribed thereunder.
(3) The Register shall receive all fees deposited under this section
and, after deducting reasonable administrative costs, shall deposit the
balance in the Treasury of the United States, in such manner as the
Secretary of the Treasury directs.
(4) The Royalty fees thus deposited in connection with video record-
ing devices and media shall, in accordance with the procedures provided
by clause (5), be distributed to the owners of copyright in motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works that were included in television trans-
missions ....
(5) The royalty fees thus deposited shall be distributed in accordance
with the following procedures:
(A) During such month that the Tribunal shall establish in each
year following the year in which this Act takes effect, every person
claiming to be entitled to compulsory license fees under clause (4) shall
file a claim with the Tribunal for fees covered by all statements of ac-
count for periods during the preceding year in accordance with require-
ments that the Tribunal shall prescribe by regulation. Notwithstanding
any provisions of the antitrust laws, for purposes of this clause any
claimants may agree among themselves as to the proportionate division
of compulsory licensing fees among them, may lump their claims to-
gether and file them jointly or as a single claim, or may designate a com-
mon agent to receive payment on their behalf.
(c) DETERMINATION OF ROYALTY FEES.-
(1) Not later than thirty days after the effective date of this Act,
the Chairman of the Tribunal shall cause notice to be published in the
Federal Register of the initiation of proceedings for the purpose of de-
termining appropriate and reasonable royalty fees to be paid by manu-
facturers and importers for the distribution of video recording devices
and video recording media in the United States. Such proceedings shall
be initiated and concluded in accordance with section 804(e) of this
title.
(2) Such fees shall be calculated to afford to copyright owners of
motion pictures and other audiovisual works a fair compensation for use
of their creative works.
151. See infra text and accompanying notes 119-29.
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movie in first run theatres, sale of prerecorded tapes, and negotiated
royalties on television. 5 2 They view the royalty tax as a fourth bite
in the commercial exploitation of a work, overcompensating the
copyright owner even though the major use of VTR, for time shift-
ing, causes no tangible harm.15 Moreover, the copyright owner has
exploited the public airwaves whose stations are licensed to serve
the public convenience and necessity and whose broadcasts are for
the use of the general public. 5 4 Some of the material broadcast over
public airwaves is not protected by copyright. Finally, supporters of
the exemption believe that anything but a complete exemption will
have an undue negative impact on the retailers of VTR and the de-
velopment of this new technology.'55
The major thrust of the argument for total exemption relates to
the economics of public goods.'5 6 In effect, supporters of total ex-
emption claim that it is wasteful to reduce the utility of consumers
and users of VTR when sufficient compensation induces the copy-
right owner to continue investment in the protection of works of au-
thorship. At present, there is perhaps some justification for this po-
sition if viewed strictly in the short run. Today the relatively high
price of videotape may preclude librarying, but if the price for tape
continues to fall, the production of audiovisual works for television
may become endangered to a perhaps greater degree than in the
152. Home Recording Legislation of 1981: Hearings on S. 1758 Before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981)(statement of Jack Wayman, senior
vice president, Consumer Electronics Group, Electronics Industries Association at
pages 7-10) [hereinafter cited Wayman Statement]
153. Id. at 10-11. See, also, Ferris Statement, supra note 121.
154. As Sony's petition for certiorari states: "[this case] involves works which
plaintiffs voluntarily choose to have telecast over public airwaves to individual homes
free of charge . . . voluntarily expolit their works by commingling them with all the
other programs on free off-the-air T.V." Petition, supra note 12, at D-7. Representa-
tives of the VTR industry argue similarly. Copyright owners are making use of the
public domain of the broadcast airwaves to achieve the maximum dissemination of
their product. They have chosen this route to disseminate their works but if they
want total control they need not use television as their medium but can either sell or
rent their works directly to the public. Ferris Statement, supra note 121, at 22. The
movie industry counters this argument as follows: "Property rights are not transitory,
nor do they lose their privacy when they leave one environment and enter another."
Valenti Statement, supra note 124, at 36. Nimmer argues that the compulsory license
legitimates home taping and would render unnecessary an attempt to invade the pri-
vacy of the home and allow the home taper to make full use of public airwaves with
impunity. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 13.05(F) at 13-96.
155. See Wayman Statement, supra note 15, at 11.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
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case of audio taping. 157 Although the degree of harm at this time is
indeterminate, the history of new replicative technologies suggest
the possibility of almost universal access to VTR.
15
'
The particular vulnerability of the audiovisual work dictates the
establishment of a mechanism proposed by Senator Mathias and
Representative Edwards (Betamax Bill) which would balance the
rights of creators and users.15 ' This bill would exempt home taping
for private purposes from copyright infringement 60 while creating a
compulsory license for audiovisual works. 61 Manufacturers would
pay a royalty, determined by the copyright royalty tribunal, on each
VTR machine and videotape sold.1" The Copyright Royalty Tribu-
nal (CRT) would distribute the proceeds of the royalty to copyright
owners after deducting administrative costs.6 '
The Betamax Bill confers great discretionary authority on a gov-
ernmental administrative agency, the CRT, which has been criti-
cized for typical bureaucratic inefficiency.""' Nonetheless, a compul-
sory license administered by the CRT is preferable to a private
marketplace solution implemented under court suprvision. 1 5 Unlike
157. For the great expense and risk involved in the production of movies see
Valenti Statement, supra note 124, at 11. See also supra note 74.
158. As for example in photocopying, where costs have continued to decline and
the quality contines to improve.
159. S. 1758, supra note 150.
160. Id. at § 119(a).
161. Id. at § 119(b).
162. Id. at § 119(c).
163. Id. at § 119(b)(5)(B).
164. Clarence James, former chairman of the CRT, has complained that the
CRT does not have enough to do. Nevertheless, there is a two-year lag in the distri-
bution of cable royalties. Shenon, Cable TV's Benefactor Comes under Fire, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 9, 1981, at 6, col. 1. Cable T.V. royalties involve several levels of govern-
mental regulation, pricing, and distributional problems. This has lead some experts to
argue for a return to a free market system to avoid wasteful complexities, needless
bureaucracy, and unfairness to copyright owners. See Geller, REGULATION (May/June
1981) at 35. Unlike cable royalty (17 U.S.C. § 111), the assessment and distribution of
VTR royalties do not present the same great degree of pricing and distributional
complexities. For example, compare the computation of royalties for cable T.V. re-
transmisson (17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2)) with the VTR royalty. For an explanation of the
cable royalty see A. LATMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, 450-54 (1981).
165. Besen, Manning and Mitchel have summarized general objections to com-
pulsory licenses in the context of cable T.V. as follows. First, the fixed fee has no
relation to prices that the market place would produce if transactions were costless.
Second, compulsory license formulas are inflexible to changing economic develop-
ments. Third, compulsory license royalties require a mechanism for distribution.
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a court of law, the CRT is well situated, as an expert body currently
administering other statutory compulsory licenses under the Copy-
right Act,""6 to adjust the terms of a royalty on VTR to changing
conditions in the industry.16
7
One modification of the CRT's current royalty discretion under
the bill should be reconsidered. As the legislation reads, the CRT
must decide, according to the principles of fair compensation, the
initial royalty fee to be reconsidered in 1985 and in five-year inter-
vals thereafter.6 " Instead, Congress should specifiy the royalty for
the first five-year interval, allowing a period of reflection to deter-
mine the extent, if any, that VTR harms video markets. This would
also enable the parties involved in the administrative process to con-
centrate on other aspects of the distributional mechanism rather
than be diverted into extent-of-royalty considerations.
How much should the initial royalty be? The Motion Picture As-
sociation of America has used for illustrative purposes, $50.00 per
machine and $1.00 per tape. 6 9 These figures seem somewhat high at
this time, particularly in a price-sensitive home electronics industry.
Manufacturers will pass on the surcharge to consumers unless they
are willing to sustain a tighter profit margin. 7 0 Since the nature of
the harm to video markets is ambiguous, for the initial royalty Con-
gress should err on the low side to study the effect the surcharge has
Fourth, a too-low compulsory license royalty has an adverse effect on program supply
market. See Besen, supra note 19, at 88-92. Do these arguments carry the same force
in the VTR context? It appears not. First, VTR would not be costless because of the
number of parties and interests involved. Second, the VTR formula in the Betamax
Bill provides for flexibility by specifying periodic review of the royalty fees. Third,
the VTR specifies that CRT will distribute the fees which will be the most compli-
cated aspect of the Betamax Bill, but it is hard to see how these complexities could
otherwise be avoided by a private market solution. Fourth, the VTR does not present
the same free rider effect as does cable T.V. and even if the royalty is set too low for
VTR, there is no indication that program supply markets would be curtailed.
166. CRT's distributions of the 1978 cable royalties have been sustained in Na-
tional Assoc. of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, No. 80-2273, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 9, 1982). Much of the delay in the distribution of royalties is due to
the appealability of CRT decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. 17 U.S.C. § 810. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 89, § 14.11 at 140-73.
167. S. 1758 § 119(c)(4).
168. Id.
169. See Valenti Statement, supra note 74, at 41.
170. The evidence is conflicting about how much, if any, of such a royalty would
be absorbed by the Japanese manufacturer or U.S. retailer. Cf. Valenti Statement,
supra note 74, at 37; But see Ferris Statement, supra note 121, at 37. It would appear
that all things being equal, much of the royalty fee will be passed on to consumers.
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on the operation of the market over a five-year interval.
The royalty provisions of the bill are an imperfect solution in an
imperfect world. Only two other countries have enacted similar pro-
visions: Germany,1 1 which imposes a royalty on the sale of recording
devices, and Austria, 1 2 on blank tapes. Both apply the tax to audio
as well as video recording devices and tapes. Unlike the German sys-
tem, the Betamax Bill properly imposes the royalty on videotape as
well as the VTR.1' 3 The royalty on the tape acts as a metering de-
vice placing the greatest burden of the tax on those who are engag-
ing in librarying, the most objectionable practice from the copyright
owner's standpoint. 14 The non-librarying user who uses the same
tape over and over for time shifting will be penalized less. Unfortu-
nately, the royalty will affect the non-infringing consumer who uses
the VTR along with a video camera to make his own movies or play
prerecorded tapes. This drawback to the royalty is probably una-
voidable because there is, of course, no feasible method of determin-
ing the eventual use of a VTR or tape.
VII. CONCLUSION
New and useful replicative technologies allowing universal access
to copyrighted works continue to strain the law's ability to protect
the output of the creative artist. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Betamax in a well reasoned opinion struggled admirably in trying
to apply traditional copyright principles to the latest threat from
the new technology-the VTR. The Court found off-the-air taping
for private purposes to constitute infringement but the difficult
question of remedy remains: how to meet both the needs of the
copyright owner and the consumer without impeding the production
of artistic works or the development of new technologies. The an-
swer lies in a legislative rather than a judicial solution which would
establish a compulsory license for home taping while taxing the sale
of VTR devices and tapes and distributing the royalty proceeds to
copyright owners. A compulsory license, which deprives a copyright
171. Urheberrechtsgesetz § 53(5), 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1J 1273 (W.
Ger.), summarized in Ladd Statement, supra note 122, at 48; J. Reinbothe, The Com-
pensation for Private Taping under Sec. 53(5) of the German Copyright Act, 12 IC
36 (1981).
172. Art. 42(5) Austrian Copyright Law, summarized in Ladd Statement, supra
note 122 at 50.
173. S. 1758 § 119(c).
174. See Ladd Statement, supa note 122, at 32.
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owner of control over his work, is to be used sparingly, but because
of the nature of the interest, the numerous parties, and the public
interest, such a remedy provides the best feasible solution to a diffi-
cult problem.
The American motion picture industry, the world's largest, is a
bright spot in the American economy contributing significantly to
our balance of trade.17 5 Other nations, buyers of American movies,
which are considering the question of home video taping will be in-
fluenced by the resolution of this issue in the United States. The
Betamax Bill may ultimately benefit our economy as well as protect
the output of our creative artists.
175. Industry estimates indicate that the U.S. movie industry contributes one
billion dollars in a surplus balance of payments. See Valenti Statement, supra note
74, at p. 5.
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